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Abstract
Intellectual diversity – ‘two heads are better than one’,
‘don’t put all your eggs in one basket’ – has long been
used to reduce the impact of human error. More formally,
in recent years engineered design diversity has been used
extensively to achieve dependability in software-based
systems. This use of design diversity prompted the first
formal quantitative studies of the efficacy of intellectual
diversity. In this paper we examine how diversity might be
used to increase confidence in dependability claims
(reliability, safety) about systems. Our purpose is to see
whether the probabilistic approach that has been successful
in design diversity can be applied to diversity in arguments.
1. Introduction
We are all familiar with informal ways in which
diversity is used to increase confidence. For example, if
you ask me to check your arithmetic you are tacitly
assuming that the use of a different person (intellectual
diversity) is more likely to pick up your mistakes than if
you simply checked your own work. This idea of ‘a
different pair of eyes’ is widespread in science and
engineering. Indeed, it could be said that the whole
scientific method, with its checks and balances based on
review by colleagues (and rivals), is crucially dependent on
the efficacy of diversity. More formally, deliberate
diversity in design is often used to gain protection from
common faults that may be present in merely redundant
systems. In particular, in recent years design diversity has
been proposed as a means of protecting against software
faults (see [1] for a recent review of work in this area).
In this paper we consider the use of diversity in
arguments – so-called multi-legged arguments – that are
used to make claims about the dependability (safety,
reliability, etc) of a system. The use of diversity here is
aimed at increasing the confidence we can place in such
claims. Whilst multi-legged arguments to support safety
claims have been used for years, there appears to be no
formal theory to support them: the work reported here is a
tentative beginning to such a theory.
The need for better ways of justifying dependability
claims is clear. In critical systems, particularly, the costs
of justifying safety claims can be enormous, and are likely
to grow. In some cases, the costs involved in supporting
safety claims can be greater then the costs involved in
building the systems. For example, the French RER
railway in Paris contains a safety-critical system with
about 20,000 lines of code [2]; 100 person years was
spent on safety assurance. NASA quoted several years ago
a figure of more than $1,000 per line for production and
assurance of Space Shuttle code, and it is known that this
contains many faults.
Diverse arguments have been applied in real safety
cases. For example, in the safety case for the UK’s
Sizewell B nuclear power plant, an issue concerned what
could be claimed about the probability of failure on
demand (pfd) of the software in the Primary Protection
System (PPS). A two-legged argument was used [3] based
on the ‘special case’ procedure of the UK’s Safety
Assessment Principles for Nuclear Power Plants [4] (also
available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/nsd/saps.htm).
Several standards and codes of practice suggest the use
of diverse arguments. In UK Def Stan 00-55 [5], for
example, one leg is based upon logical proof, the other
upon a probabilistic claim based upon statistical analysis.
The legs are sometimes quite asymmetric: for example, in
[6] the first leg is potentially complex, whereas the second
leg is deliberately simple1. Occasionally, the only
difference between the legs lies in the people involved,
e.g. in certain kinds of IV&V.
At an informal level, diversity seems plausibly to be
‘a good thing’, but there is no theoretical underpinning to
such an assertion. In particular, we do not know how
much confidence we can justifiably place in a
dependability claim when this is supported by diverse
arguments. This situation contrasts with the use of
                                                
1 The language here – and indeed the underlying structure – is
very similar to a type of design diversity used in certain types of safety
system, where a complex, highly functional primary version is backed
up by a much more simple secondary system. This is just one of many
examples of the duality between design diversity and argument
diversity, an issue we intend to address in more detail in future work.
diversity in design, where probability models have
provided significant new insights2.
It is worth saying here that we should not expect
diversity to be a panacea for problems of building
dependability cases. Even in areas where we might expect
diversity to be particularly successful, it is possible to find
surprising evidence for its limitations. We have mentioned
earlier the importance diversity seems to play in the ‘hard’
sciences, e.g. in notions of repeatability of experiments, of
independent peer review, etc. There has been some study of
this kind of diversity by social scientists. In a fascinating
paper [7], it was shown that the diversity present in the
world-wide community of physicists did not prevent over-
confidence in claims about the accuracy of assessments of
numerous physical constants (speed of light, charge on the
electron, etc) over more than a century. Such observations
are somewhat chastening for anyone involved in the
application of diversity to computer-based systems: most
of us would not expect our understanding of our domain to
rival that of physicists of theirs…
2. How have multi-legged arguments been
built in practice? – informal discussion
It is notable that multi-legged arguments show very
different structures, and use very different types of content
in the different legs. Examples, for two-legged arguments,
include:
1. A leg based upon logical proof and a leg based upon
statistical evidence from operational testing: e.g. in the
case of an argument about software dependability, the
first could involve a claim of complete freedom from (a
class of) faults, the second a claim for a particular
probability of failure upon demand (pfd) [5, 8]
2.  A leg based upon indirect evidence, such as design
process quality, and a leg based upon direct evaluation
of the built system, each leg involving assessment via
expert judgement: e.g. in the case of software, the first
could involve evidence such as CMM (Capability
Maturity Model) level and types of procedures used, the
second could involve evidence of static analysis and of
operational testing [3];
3. A primary argument leg involving extensive evidence,
and a simpler secondary leg whose purpose is just to
compensate for potentially serious weaknesses in the
primary [6];
4. Legs that are based upon exactly the same evidence, but
use different, non-communicating teams of human
expert analysts.
                                                
2 It has to be admitted that these insights have been mainly
conceptual ones – there remain great difficulties in estimating the
parameters of the models in particular instances to allow their use in
safety cases. Nevertheless, the models have produced better
understanding – for example by warning of the perils of unwarranted
assumptions of independence of failure behaviour between versions.
It is striking how some of these arguments mimic the use
of diversity in fault-tolerant design. Thus 4 captures the
common design diversity notion of unforced diversity
between ‘functionally identical’ channels: it is the only
one in which the evidence (input) and claim (output) are
the same between the two legs. Example 3 is similar to
the system architecture in which a primary channel has
extensive functionality (at the price of complexity), whilst
a second ‘get-you-home-safely’ channel is deliberately kept
simple – often the first is implemented in software, the
second in hard-wired logic.
Whilst these examples all involve diversity, this
diversity is used in quite different ways, and the legs differ
widely both in content and type of claim. In example 1,
the first leg involves a claim for complete perfection of
operational behaviour (at least with respect to a subclass
of failures) based upon logical reasoning, whereas the
second leg would only allow a probabilistic claim based
upon statistical evidence. If the overall argument is
intended to support a claim of (better than) 10-4 pfd, only
the statistical leg addresses this directly. Nevertheless, it is
easy to see how the logical leg can support the other: if
the statistical evidence alone gives 99% confidence that
the pfd is smaller than 10-4, then the additional ‘proof leg’
might allow this level of confidence in 10-4 to be
increased.
Note, however, the dependence here: the observation of
a failure in the testing leg would completely refute the
perfection claim of the first leg. A similar potential
dependence can be seen in the second example: direct
evidence arising from the examination of the built system
in the second argument leg could cast doubt upon the
claims for process quality coming from the first leg. Just
as claims for independence between system failures are
generally not believable, so it seems we might expect
there to be dependence between different argument legs.
The differences between these examples suggest that
there is no agreement about the best ways to structure
diverse arguments. Informally, we might say that our goal
is to make claims at as high a ‘level’ as we can, with
‘confidence’ as high as we can make it. But it is not clear
how we should go about achieving these goals, nor even
how we should formally express them (e.g. how we
should resolve the trade-off between claim level and
confidence).
For example, what are the relative merits of arguments
that mimic the symmetric structure of 1-out-of-2
protection systems, and those unsymmetric arguments
where a second leg is designed to compensate for the
expected weaknesses of a primary leg? Perhaps the former
are more appropriate for those situations where we have
little knowledge of the precise ways in which arguments
might fail – here we would be depending upon a claim for
general efficacy of diversity.
What are the relative merits of ‘forced’ and ‘natural’
diversity? Again, this may come down to how much
knowledge we have about potential weaknesses in
arguments – we need to know that, if we have forced
diversity in a particular way, this is appropriate for our
problem. Issues of this kind also arise, of course, when
diversity is used to achieve dependability in systems; here
also it is necessary to be confident that ‘functional
diversity’ fits the problem. For example, in the design of a
1-out-of-2 protection system the choice to monitor
temperature and pressure in the different channels, rather
than (say) temperature and flow rate, requires knowledge on
the part of the designers.
The answers to questions like these depend on
understanding better what it is we are trying to protect
ourselves from by using diverse arguments. What are the
kinds of weaknesses present in single arguments that
might be addressed by diversity? These seem to fall into
two kinds: weaknesses in modelling assumptions, and
weaknesses in evidence3.
Any argument to support a dependability claim about a
system will depend upon some assumptions. For example,
a claim of ‘perfection’ about some software, based upon a
formal verification that the program correctly implements
its specification, assumes that this formal specification is
an accurate representation of some higher level informal
engineering requirements. If we had any doubt about the
truth of this assumption (and how could we not?), we
might require a second argument leg in the form of
appropriately extensive operational testing. Seeing no
failures in the testing (judged against the engineering
requirements) would make us more confident in the truth
of the assumption (in spite of what Edsger Dijkstra
said4…).
Weaknesses in the evidence for a single argument leg
can similarly be a reason to require a second leg. For
example, here we might reverse the reasoning of the
previous paragraph. If the first leg involves a statistical
claim using operational testing, but it is infeasible to test
for sufficiently long to substantiate the claim at the
required level of confidence, we might require a second
argument leg involving extensive static analysis.
Whatever the reason for using multiple argument legs,
the intention is always the same: we want to be able to
have more (justifiable) confidence in the dependability of
our system from the two (or more) legs than is provided
by either one alone. This issue of composability seems
fundamental: how much benefit do we get from this
approach in a particular instance? In the following section
we present a somewhat tentative formalism to address this
question for a simple example of a two-legged argument.
                                                
3 For simplicity we shall ignore here a third possibility, that the
reasoning  used by the expert to make the claim, based on the
assumptions and the evidence, is flawed. This may need to be
considered in some cases, but we believe that it can be treated as a
simple extension of the general approach described here.
4 ‘Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but
never to show their absence!’ [9]E. W. Dijkstra, "Notes on structured
programming," in Structured Programming, O.-J. Dahl, E. W. Dijkstra,
and C. A. R. Hoare, Eds. London and New york: Academic, 1972, pp.
1-82.
3. Uncertainty, confidence and diversity – a
tentative formalism
Uncertainty is ubiquitous in dependability studies.
Most obviously, we are uncertain about when systems
will fail. In the face of such uncertainty we use
probability models as a means of describing the failure
behaviour. So measures of dependability are probabilistic:
e.g. probability of failure on demand, failure rate, etc.
All this is well understood and widely accepted,5 and
there is a comprehensive probabilistic theory and
methodology for systems dependability. Less well
understood is the uncertainty associated with the
assessment of dependability. We have argued elsewhere
[10] that a formal theory of uncertainty, based upon
probability, is needed here to capture the notion of
confidence in dependability claims. In particular, we need
such a formalism to be able to analyse the efficacy of
argument diversity as a means of increasing confidence in
dependability claims: cf. the probabilistic modelling of
design diversity, which allows its benefits in increasing
systems reliability to be analysed [1].
The interpretation of probabilities in these two
situations is different of course. Probabilistic measures of
dependability concern ‘natural’ uncertainty in the world;
probabilistic measures of confidence in dependability
claims concern beliefs about the world, e.g. about whether
some assumptions underpinning the reasoning in an
argument are true. It seems inevitable that there will be a
subjective element in the latter, and thus probabilities –
confidence – will need to be interpreted in a Bayesian,
subjective way.
In a diverse system – e.g. a 1-out-of-2 system – the
reliability is determined by the reliabilities of the
individual versions and the dependence between the two
version failure processes. It seems possible that similar
considerations apply in the case of diverse arguments.
Thus ‘confidence’ could play the same role for an
argument as ‘reliability’ does for a system. Similarly,
argument ‘dependence’ might also be defined in terms of
confidence. Thus we could say that two arguments are
i n d e p e n d e n t  if they allow simple multiplicative
manipulation of confidence, as in the case of reliability.
For example, we would say that two arguments A and B
are independent if each individually gives 90% confidence
that the pfd is smaller than 10-3 and together they give
99% confidence in the same claim.
In practice, it seems unlikely that arguments will be
independent in this way, just as claims for independence
between the failure behaviour of design-diverse systems
                                                
5 Although there have been attempts to eliminate uncertainty by
using formal verification to support claims for complete perfection in
software-based systems, these have been largely unsuccessful. There
is now a consensus that for systems of even modest complexity such
claims will be unbelievable.
are rarely believable. Notice, however, that dependence
need not be ‘a bad thing’: as in design diversity [11], there
may be the (theoretical) possibility for a kind of negative
covariance in argument diversity, resulting in confidence
even greater than would come from independence. In fact,
we may have some knowledge about the weaknesses of
one argument, and be able to construct a second one to
avoid these (albeit at the expense of containing other,
novel, weaknesses).  
We now proceed to develop these ideas somewhat more
formally. Each argument leg can be thought of as a triple,
comprising some evidence and modelling assumptions that
together support a claim or assertion at a certain level of
confidence.
Consider the situation of an argument leg A in which a
safety goal is expressed as an assertion, GA. For example:
•  GA: ‘the probability of failure on demand of the
protection system software is less than 10-3’.
Argument A is based upon some assumptions that we
call AssA. An example might be:
•  AssA: ‘the statistical testing, from which we shall
obtain a quantitative estimate of the reliability, is
truly representative of the distribution of demands
that will be met in real system operation, and these
demands are statistically independent’.
We now go out and collect evidence for the leg. That is
we conduct a statistical test, e.g. we observe 4603 demands
under conditions that satisfy assA (this number of demands
is chosen so that, if they exhibit no failures, we shall be
able to claim that the system has, with 99% confidence, a
better than 10-3 pfd [12]). The evidence then tells us,
subject to the truth of our assumptions, whether that leg
stands or falls (i.e. whether we succeed in executing the
4603 demands without observing a failure, or we fail).
Denote by EA  the event that the evidence for A  does in
fact turn out to support the assertion GA:
• EA: 4603 demands are executed without failure.
Then, for argument leg A we can say
P(GA | EA , ass A ) £ a or P(G A | EA , ass A ) ≥ 1- a (1)
where a is 0.01. That is, we can say that the argument leg
A, represented by the triple (GA,  EA,  assA), supports the
claim at the (1-a) level of confidence, given the truth of
the assumptions and the support of the evidence. More
precisely, the probability of the claim being false, given
the evidence is supportive and the assumptions are true, is
no greater than a.
The uncertainty in this kind of argument, which gives
rise to the doubt in the truth of the claim expressed in the
probabilistic confidence level, comes from the statistical
nature of the evidence. Other kinds of argument may be
completely deterministic, so that a claim can be expressed
with certainty assuming the truth of the assumptions. For
example, consider argument leg B:
•  GB: ‘the protection system software contains no
faults’.
•  AssB: ‘the formal specification correctly captures
the informal engineering requirements of the
system’;
• EB: the mathematical verification that the program
implements the specification is successful;
Then, for argument leg B, represented by the triple
(GA, EA, assA) we are certain that the assertion is true.
That is, we can say
P(GB | EB , ass B ) = 0 or P(GB | EB , ass B ) = 1
In both these examples, the reasoning assumes the
truth of the assumptions. If, as seems likely, there is
some doubt about the truth of the assumptions of an
argument leg, this will change (reduce) the confidence that
we have in the claim. For the deterministic argument, B,
we have
P(GB | EB ) = P(GB | EB , ass B )P(ass B )
+ P(GB | EB, ass B )P(ass B )
i.e.
P(GB | EB ) £ P(ass B )
if we conservatively assume that the claim is false when
the argument is based upon a false assumption.
For the statistical argument leg A, similarly, we have
P(GA | EA ) = P(GA | EA , ass A )P(ass A )
+ P(GA | EA , ass A )P(ass A )
If we conservatively assume
P(GA | EA , ass A ) = 1
this becomes
P(GA | EA ) £ aP(ass A ) + P(ass A ) (2)
As an example, if we were 99% confident in the truth
of the assumptions underpinning A, then (2) shows that
our confidence in the claim GA has about halved compared
with the case when we are completely certain of the
assumptions: the bound (2) is approximately 0.02
compared with 0.01 from (1).6
Expression (2) shows the different roles played in this
example by extensiveness of evidence and assumption
confidence in arriving at the confidence level that can be
placed in the safety claim. By collecting more evidence of
a supportive nature (i.e. observing more failure-free
demands of the protection system) we can reduce the value
of a  and thus increase our confidence in the claim.
However, our scope for doing this is restricted by the level
of our confidence in the assumptions, represented by
P(ass A ) . There is clearly a limit to the value of collecting
more evidence of the same kind in the face of such
assumption uncertainty.
One interpretation of the reasoning behind requiring a
multi-legged argument is that it is a way to overcome, or
at least minimise, this problem. It is a means of
increasing our confidence in G, given the evidence, when
we have doubts about the truth of the assumptions
underpinning an individual argument.  
Assumption A
Evidence A
Assertion G
Evidence B
Assumption B
Figure 1. The structure of a two-legged
argument in support of a claim G
Consider the case of a two-legged argument like that of
Fig 1. This is very similar to a 1-out-of-2 system
structure: a claim is rejected if either argument leg rejects
it. Just as we would claim that the probability of failure of
a 1-o-o-2 system was less than the probability of failure of
either channel, so here we can expect that the chance of
accepting a false claim will be less with the two-legged
structure than it would be with either leg on its own. The
detailed way in which confidence in the claim depends
upon the evidence and assumptions can be seen in the
following expression:
                                                
6 When we say that our confidence is halved, we mean that our
belief in the falsity of the claim has doubled. This is similar to
‘reliability’ studies, where probabilities almost always relate to
unreliabilities. Whilst our discussion in the paper will use words like
confidence, we shall almost always be dealing with such probabilities of
falsity or failure.
P(G | EA , EB ) = P(G | EA , EB , ass A , ass B )P(ass A , ass B )
+ P(G | EA , EB , ass A , ass B )P(ass A , ass B )
+ P(G | EA , EB , ass A , ass B )P(ass A , ass B )
+ P(G | EA , EB , ass A , ass B )P(ass A , ass B )
(3)
We shall now consider some simple examples to
illustrate how this works.
Example 1
Consider the case where each of the arguments is of
the deterministic, logical type, supporting a claim for
impossibility of failure, like B above: call them B1, B2.
We have
P(G | EB1 , EB2 )
= P(G | EB1 , EB2 , ass B1 , ass B2 )P(ass B1 , ass B2 )
£ P(ass B1 , ass B2 )
(4)
Here we have used the fact that in this type of
argument, if either of the assumptions is true, and the
evidence supports the claim, then the claim is true with
certainty. Thus the first three terms of the right hand side
of (3) are zero. In addition, the bounding value assumes
conservatively that the claim is false with certainty if both
assumptions are false.
Clearly, there will be greater confidence in the claim,
G, using the two-legged argument  compared with using
only one argument leg. The benefit will depend upon how
much smaller is the probability of both assumptions
being false, compared with the probabilities of single
assumptions being false.
Example 2
Consider now an argument involving two statistical
legs A1, A2, similar to A above. We have, from (3):
P(G | EA1 , EA2 )
£ P(G | EA1 , EA2 , ass A1 , ass A2 )P(ass A1 , ass A2 )
+ P(G | EA1 , ass A1 )P(ass A1 , ass A2 )
+ P(G | EA2 , ass A2 )P(ass A1 , ass A2 )
+ P(ass A1 , ass A2 )
(5)
Here we have assumed that, when the assumption
underpinning a leg is false, the argument conservatively
reduces to a single leg, i.e. confidence in the claim depends
only upon the leg that is based on a true assumption. The
bounding value, again, conservatively assumes that when
both legs are based on false assumptions the claim is
certain to be false.
Assuming further that our beliefs about the arguments
are ‘symmetric’ in the following way (this can be thought
of, informally, as a kind of indifference between the
arguments), and extending the earlier notation for the
single argument, we have:
P(ass A1 ) = P(ass A2 ) = p
P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) = P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) = q  (< p)
P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) = r
P(G | EA1 , ass A1 ) = P(G | EA2 , ass A2 ) = a
A special case is the one where the argument
assumptions can be seen as ‘mutually exclusive’, i.e.
P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) = 0
Then, since
P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) + P(ass A1 , ass A2 )
+ P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) + P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) = 1
we have
2q + r = 1
and so from (5) we get
P(G | EA1 , EA2 ) £ a(1 - r ) + r (6)
which contrasts with the single argument result, (2):
P(G | EAi ) £ a (1 - p) + p (7)
To get a feel for the benefits of a two-legged argument
over a single one in these rather specialised circumstances,
consider the following numerical examples. Let a=0.1,
p=0.1, and r=0.05 (suggesting a plausible positive
dependence between the assumptions). The bound in (7) is
0.19, that in (6) is 0.145. Thus confidence in the claim
has risen from 81% (based on a single argument) to 85.5%
as a result of using two argument legs.
Consider now the special case where a=0.1, p=0.1, and
r=0.01. Here r=p2, i.e. the same value for the probability
of simultaneous assumption falsity as would occur if there
were independence between the assumptions (but note that
in fact there is dependence here). The two-legged argument
increases the confidence in the claim from 81% to 89.1%.
If we were able to reduce the chance of simultaneous
failure (falsity) of the arguments further, in the spirit of
the ‘forced design diversity’ idea of [11], we would have
even greater confidence in the claim. Let
P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) = (1 - e) p
2  where e > 0
and it is easy to show that
P(G | EA1 , EA2 ) £ a(1 - p
2 ) + p2 - (1- a )ep 2
where the last term is the improvement over the previous
case of r=p2. If a=0.1, p=0.1, and e=0.5, our confidence in
the claim now becomes 89.55%
Remember that in this example the highest confidence
in the claim from a single argument is 90%, which occurs
when we are certain the assumption is true (the
uncertainty then centres entirely upon the evidence, i.e.
upon the value of a). Thus the use of two legs has almost
restored the confidence to the highest level possible, i.e.
almost completely eliminated the problem of assumption
doubt. In fact, if we could be certain  that the two
arguments were not both false, i.e. e=1, we get exactly
this maximum confidence – all the uncertainty in the
claim comes from the evidence.
The worst case in this example occurs when r=0.1 (i.e.
= p ): there is then no benefit from the two-legged
argument, and the confidence in the claim is exactly the
same as for a single argument, i.e. 81%.
It is worth briefly considering the case of
independence. That is, instead of the ‘mutually exclusive’
arguments used above, consider the case where
P(ass A1 ) = P(ass A2 ) = p
P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) = P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) = p(1- p)
P(ass A1 , ass A2 ) = (1 - p)
2
P(G | EA1 , ass A1 ) = P(G | EA2 , ass A2 ) = a
Then
P(G | EA1 , EA2 )
£ P(G | EA1 , EA2 , ass A1 , ass A2 )(1- p)
2 + 2ap(1 - p) + p 2
£ a(1- p)2 + 2ap(1 - p) + p 2
= a(1- p2 ) + p 2
(8)
where it is conservatively assumed that confidence in the
claim G based on two valid legs is only as great as that
based on one (i.e. 1-a). As above, when a=0.1, p=0.1 the
two-legged argument raises confidence in the claim from
81% to 89.1%.
So far in this example we have made very conservative
assumptions that ensure we can never do better than a
single ‘perfect’ argument leg, i.e. one where the
assumption is known to be true. Then, for the numerical
values we have used for illustration, interest has centred
upon how close the use of diversity can bring us to this
‘perfect’ argument confidence level of 90% (=1-a). That is,
we have been solely concerned with the doubt in the claim
that arises from our doubt in the assumptions, rather than
in the evidence. A less conservative approach (in fact,
perhaps unrealistically optimistic) would be to assume that
the truth of G is certain if it is supported by two valid
arguments. We could then, for example, ignore the first
term on the right of (8). In this case, the bound on
confidence in G from the two-legged argument rises to
97.2%, which exceeds the highest confidence we could ever
get from a single argument.
Example 3
Consider now a ‘mixed’ two-legged argument in which
one leg is of the ‘logical certainty’ type (see B above), and
the other is statistical (see A). We shall conservatively
take the claim G to be the same as GA – since GB implies
GA. In (3)
P(G | EA , EB ) = P(G | EA , EB , ass A , ass B )P(ass A , ass B )
+ P(G | EA , EB , ass A , ass B )P(ass A , ass B )
+ P(G | EA , EB , ass A , ass B )P(ass A , ass B )
+ P(G | EA , EB , ass A , ass B )P(ass A , ass B )
the first and third terms on the right hand side are zero,
because G  is true with certainty, from leg B , if the
verification, based on valid assumptions, supports G . So
the probability of incorrectly deciding that G is true is:
P(G | EA , EB ) = P(G | EA , EB , ass A , ass B )P(ass A , ass B )
+ P(G | EA , EB , ass A , ass B )P(ass A , ass B )
£ P(G | EA, ass A )P(ass A ,ass B ) + P(ass A , ass B )
= aP(ass A , ass B ) + P(ass A , ass B )
Here we have assumed, conservatively, that G is false
if the two sets of assumptions are false; and that if just
assB is false, then confidence in G depends only upon leg
A .
This bound contrasts with the single argument cases
(in an obvious extension of the earlier notation):
P(G | EA ) £ a(1- pA ) + p A
P(G | EB ) £ p B
If we assume independence here, the bound for the
two-legged argument becomes:
a(1- pA ) pB + pA p B (9)
Letting pA=pB=0.1, confidence in the claim G  is
98.1%, an increase from 81% from the A  argument alone,
or 90% from the B argument alone. Note, however, that
this 98.1% falls short, as would be expected, of the 100%
confidence we have when the B assumption is known to
be true with certainty. On the other hand, it is better than
could be attained by A alone even if we knew assA were
true.
4. Discussion and conclusion
We have only considered in this paper some quite
special examples of the use of diverse argument legs.
Although further work is needed, we think that they give
us some insight into the way that diverse argument legs
work, and the benefits of extra confidence in dependability
claims that they can bring.
The examples show that – not surprisingly – there is
an increase in confidence about a dependability claim,
when using a two-legged argument, compared with the
confidence to be gained from either of the legs alone. On
the other hand, it is not easy to quantify this increase in
confidence without making many simplifying
assumptions, such as independence between different
argument assumptions. Another huge difficulty is to
assign numerical values to the many different parameters
in expressions like (3) and its successors.
An important issue that needs further exploration is
the interplay between ‘evidence’ and ‘assumptions’ in
arguments. In particular, can this kind of modelling help
in constructing arguments that make intelligent trade-offs
between the extensiveness of evidence and doubt in
argument validity?
Not surprisingly, issues of dependence (and
independence) play an important role in determining the
levels of confidence that come from multi-legged
arguments. A naïve claim of independence in the
confidence we place in the truth of the two different sets of
argument assumptions seems unreasonable here for
exactly the same reasons that Eckhardt and Lee [13] first
proposed in the case of design diversity. Specifically, it
seems likely that if we were to discover that assA were
false, we might decrease our confidence that assB were
true. The reasoning here is that the evidence of assA’s
falsity suggests that we ‘do not understand things well’ in
a general sense. Thus if we found out that our statistical
testing was not an accurate representation of operational
use, this might make us doubt whether we had correctly
captured the engineering requirements in other ways - in
particular in writing a formal specification against which
to conduct a verification for argument B.
On the other hand, continuing the analogy with design
diversity, there is a possibility in certain circumstances of
deploying arguments of forced diversity, as in [11]. That
is, assumptions might be devised such that
P(ass A , ass B ) < P(ass A )P(ass B )
In design diversity, such claims would generally be treated
with justifiable suspicion. Is there any reason to be less
sceptical in the case of diverse argument legs? The
optimistic view would be that we might have a better
understanding of the potential weaknesses of arguments –
and so be able to build ones that are complementary to one
another with respect to these weaknesses – than is the case
in systems design.
Even if this could be done, there would presumably be
a price to be paid in the amounts of evidence needed in the
individual legs: the new assumptions would be of
necessity ‘weaker’. We might need, for example, to
circumscribe ourselves strongly in each case as to what
could be assumed, in order to seek this ‘negative
dependence’. And it seems reasonable to expect that to
support a claim at a particular level of confidence with
weaker assumptions would require stronger (e.g. more)
evidence.
Example 3 shows an interesting aspect of dependence
between legs when the evidence from the testing leg, A ,
includes at least one failure of the system. In this case the
testing leg completely refutes the proof leg, B: if a fault is
found in testing, of a type that the proof leg claimed was
completely absent, the confidence in the proof leg is
immediately reduced to zero.7 The result is that the multi-
legged argument is reduced to the single testing leg, which
may or may not have sufficiently strong evidence to
support the claim at the required confidence (e.g. if there is
only one failure, but 6635 failure-free demands seen in a
test, then argument A will support a claim for a pfd of 10-3
at 99% confidence [12])
Examples like the ones above may be somewhat
special, inasmuch as each argument alone allows the same
claim to be made with a certain confidence – namely that
the pfd is smaller than 10-3 (even B does this), which is the
top-level claim for the overall two-legged argument. Such
examples are thus analogous to the use of design diversity
in a 1-out-of-2 system in which each subsystem has
similar functionality. It was this special structure that
allowed us to discuss ‘dependency’ above simply via
confidence. Not all multi-legged arguments have this
useful symmetry, just as not all applications of diversity
in system design are of the 1-out-of-n type. It might be
interesting to consider other types of diverse system design
and see whether there are analogies for diverse arguments.
                                                
7 We are not, here, considering what might be claimed after the
supposed removal of this fault. It may be that the previous (flawed)
proof can be used, together with evidence of the efficacy of the fault
removal, to support a non-zero confidence that the software is now
completely free of this class of faults.
This paper has tentatively addressed only a small part
of what seems to be a large and difficult problem.
Obviously, there is much research work to be done before
we have a formal model that supports the effective use of
diversity in dependability arguments. Nevertheless, the
approach does seem promising, and such research will
have been worthwhile if it eventually allows us to say
how much our confidence in dependability claims can be
increased by the use of diversity.
Finally, it may be worth indicating how this work
might eventually be useful in practice. There are several
different approaches to dependability cases, across different
sectors and different standards and guidelines. In principle,
a  better understanding of ‘confidence’ and argument
diversity will help us to understand the strengths and
weaknesses of these, and perhaps aid in selecting the best
for particular applications.
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